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Abstract. Regulators have a choice of approaches available to them in regulating digital 
copyright issues that lie on a scale between restrictiveness and openness. In a world in which the 
regulator seems to exclusively rely on entrenching a restrictive approach, this paper questions 
whether the long-forgotten open approach is worth reconsidering in the digital age. The ideal of 
cyber socialism is examined in the context of the roots and structure of cyberspace and its state of 
nature, and digital distribution models operating outside of the existing law are considered. The 
Creative Commons licenses are evaluated for their suitability in opening the current one-note 
regulatory regime. 
1. Introduction 
In a world in which copyright regulation is becoming ever more protectionist and restrictive in nature, it is easy 
to forget that there is more than one approach available to be taken. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 (CDPA) presently offers a framework enforcing a system of copyright protections that apply a number of 
key restrictions automatically for a generation-encompassing term ensconced in both criminal and civil sanctions 
– the classic and common approach of treating knowledge as an asset more than a public resource. The 
legislature has struggled to impose this regulatory regime upon the relatively youthful internet since its initial 
boom, with the infringement notification procedure and technical measures of the Digital Economy Act 2010 
being the latest attempt to crowbar this form of copyright protection into the digital age. But is this regulatory 
approach that is traditionally used to regulate intellectual property in the physical world necessarily appropriate 
to intangible content in a virtual world? 
 
This paper seeks to answer this question by defining the more open regulatory approach at the opposite end 
of the regulatory spectrum and exploring its applicability to cyberspace and the internet. Key differences 
between the two regulatory approaches are identified and compared with the distinctions that exist between the 
physical and virtual worlds. It is then argued that the significant overlap between the open evolution of the 
internet and the philosophies of open regulation supports the widening of pure copyright regulation into a more 
flexible licensing system that espouses the ideals of the Creative Commons, which will serve as a middle ground 
between the competing ideologies of these two different worlds whilst taking a co-habitational view that 
recognises the symbiosis between them. The Creative Commons licenses are then explained, and their primary 
criticisms considered. It is concluded that the internet has created an important new way of conducting business 
in association with the physical world and its traditional business models, but that the differences in its 
construction and operation necessitate a form of regulation that is less restrictive than pure copyright. It is 
suggested that formalisation of Creative Commons licenses as a minimum will provide a crucial regulatory 
middle ground between copyright and open source that will levy fewer technical impediments upon the evolution 
of the internet and the novel behaviours, norms and technologies that it is spawning. 
 
 
                                                          
∗
 This article updates and greatly expands upon ideas originally discussed in M Filby, 'Together in electric dreams: cyber 
socialism, utopia and the creative commons' (2008) 1 (1-2) International Journal of Private Law 94. 
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2. Regulatory Approaches 
In contextualising the differing methodologies that exist to regulate file sharing, four models of information 
policy were defined by Davies and Withers which describe four points on a regulatory spectrum ranging from 
the most restrictive to the most open.1 On the extreme of the scale where the most restrictive approach resides, 
knowledge is treated purely as an asset. This corporation-focused approach treats intellectual property in a 
similar manner to physical or tangible property, and subjects IP to the same breed of restrictions and controls as 
if it were a piece of owned land or property. The description “American conservatism” links this approach with 
the stance of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 which treats intellectual property or knowledge 
almost entirely as a corporate asset, with only a few fair dealing provisions to concede to public interest in the 
knowledge. 
 
Moving away from American conservatism sees an approach whereby knowledge is treated as an asset in the 
first instance and a public resource as a secondary consideration – the “UK knowledge economy”. This approach 
also favours the interests of the corporation, but with certain concessions made in the interests of the consumer. 
Describing the approach as the UK Knowledge Economy implies that this is where the authors view the law of 
the UK existing in that the CDPA is focussed upon restricting rights with only minor concessions to consumer 
interests, although its predominant use of civil remedies in non-commercial instances of infringement as opposed 
to a reliance upon criminal sanctions sets it apart from its US counterpart. 
 
Moving further away still sees the next model, the “learning society”, which represents an approach where 
these priorities are both still present but reversed in precedence in that knowledge is treated as a public resource 
primarily and as an asset secondarily. This approach allows the consumer more rights when it comes to dealing 
with and accessing intellectual property, to some extent disempowering the legal fortitude of digital rights / 
restrictions management (DRM) as a concession to, for example, fair use safe harbours. In describing this 
position as the basis of a learning society, the authors cite a number of examples of how certain European states 
have interpreted the requirements of the EC Copyright Directive2 in a less strict sense than jurisdictions such as 
the UK, consequently affording a greater degree of openness in the use of intellectual property. However, 
regulation has changed in the intervening period since the commentary was submitted in 2006. For example, 
since Davies and Withers commended the measures taken by the French legislature via the DADVSI law3 to 
impose a legal requirement to guarantee the interoperability of intellectual property subject to DRM, the law has 
been radically reformed to the effect that it has been brought closer to the approach of the US DMCA. 
 
The final model on the regulatory spectrum, cyber socialism, is not presently represented by the regulative 
approach of any jurisdiction. It is important not to confuse the concept of applying the tenets of socialism to the 
digital domain with physical world socialist regimes, nor to dismiss the model simply on the basis that it differs 
to what physical world free markets and physical world regulations have been principally designed to 
accommodate. The question of whether a freer digital market would enable greater commercial success to those 
who choose to innovate rather than regulate is important when considering regulatory reform that protects free 
market principles without impeding the evolution of online business practices, so it must be considered to what 
extent the digital market can be unburdened without losing benefit to creators and users alike. Indeed, if it can be 
established that cyber socialism is not only a more viable approach as compared to the current obstructive,  
                                                          
1
 W Davies and K Withers, Public Innovation: Intellectual Property in a Digital Age (Institute for Public Policy Research, 
London 2006), 72 et seq. 
2
 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L167 22/06/2001, 10-19. 
3
 Loi n°2006-961 du 1 août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information, 14 June 2009; 
see Legifrance, 'Dispositions portant transposition de la Directive 2001/29/CE du Parlement Europeen et du Conseil du 22 
Mai 2001 sur l'harmonisation de certains aspects du droit d'auteur et des droits voisins dans la societe de l'information' 
(Legifrance 2006) <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000266350&dateTexte=> 
accessed March 2011. 
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restrictive and artificial forces being exerted upon the digital world, but perhaps even a more desirable approach, 
then it may serve to highlight why existing approaches are not sitting well with the users and facilitators of the 
internet. 
3. The Ideals of Cyber Socialism 
There are a number of approaches to socialism which have been (and indeed still are) taken as the basis of a 
political ideal which its followers believe would benefit society if its principles were applied to the manner in 
which society is regulated4. Although some differences do persist between individual socialist bodies and 
organisations, such as the question of whether a socialist order would require a form of moneyless utopia in 
which to properly exist, all share the goal of common ownership of property and equality in access to and 
distribution of goods5. But the concept of socialism also attracts a number of common criticisms. For example, a 
key criticism that has been explored in a seminal critique6 points out that the distribution of goods on an 
egalitarian basis is unrealistic due to the problem of unequal demands leading to an exhaustion of certain wares, 
sometimes referred to as the economic calculation problem. It has also been opined that the forms of socialism 
that steer away from the controlling arms of a government or another similarly controlling entity will inevitably 
descend into anarchy, and that what is seen as altruistic equality in production and distribution will lead to a 
serious deficit in the incentive effect upon producers and creators7. 
 
In defining the approaches to regulating file sharing, Davies and Withers have provided a strong 
contextualised definition of what they have dubbed cyber socialism – a socialist regime within the realm of 
cyberspace. This definition requires a deconstruction of the distinction between the users and consumers of 
digital information on the one hand, and the rights holders on the other. It is suggested that this deconstruction 
will be in favour of a world, whether virtual or otherwise, in which the public domain flourishes and creators are 
both willing and compelled (although specifically by what is left unidentified in the definition) to produce and 
share work with their fellow file sharers. This state of regulation or, indeed, deregulation most closely describes 
how the internet would naturally be used and would function if all information was made available for free and 
unfettered distribution among its users. 
 
The characteristics of this approach to regulation can be defined as follows: 
 
• Policy is developed around the interests of internet users; 
• Intellectual property regulations are cut or abolished entirely; 
• Consumers are also producers, and producers are also consumers; 
 
 
                                                          
4
 A Einstein, 'Why Socialism?' (1949) 1(1) Monthly Review 1 <http://www.monthlyreview.org/598einstein.php> accessed 
March 2011. 
5
 See, for example, “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property”; 
K Marx and F Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' (Marxists Internet Archive 1848) 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm> accessed March 2011. 
6
 G Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/162/3859/1243> accessed March 2011. 
7
 “If competition has its evils, it prevents greater evils… It is the common error of Socialists to overlook the natural indolence 
of mankind… Competition may not be the best conceivable stimulus, but it is at present a necessary one, and no one can 
foresee the time when it will not be indispensable to progress… it would be difficult to induce the general assembly of an 
association to submit to the trouble and inconvenience of altering their habits by adopting some new and promising 
invention, unless their knowledge of the existence of rival associations made them apprehend that what they would not 
consent to do, others would, and that they would be left behind in the race.” JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy with 
some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (7th edn Longmans, Green and Co., London 1909), Book IV, Chapter VII, 
p.64. 
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• Digital rights / restrictions management is intrinsically immoral.8 
 
 
The definition of this regulatory approach recognises that any limitation of the sharing of any type of 
information would be responsible for interfering with the progress of the digital commons, and that this would be 
directly against the very construct of the internet itself. The ethic of such an approach can be interpreted as being 
fundamentally anti-capitalist in nature, and could also be viewed as being actively hostile to the capitalist 
philosophy of providing financial reward for the labour of others to the point of advocating and encouraging 
communism9. Nevertheless, it is prima facie apparent that the application of cyber socialism is in practice 
distinct enough from physical world socialism in certain key areas that will allow it to address at least some of 
the most prominent criticisms of the latter. For example, the problem of the distribution of property on a purely 
egalitarian basis inevitably leading to exhaustion of goods would be rectified by the fact that the nature of 
intellectual property is intangible. As copies of intellectual property can be produced and distributed at virtually 
no cost, it follows that an intangible good cannot be physically exhausted in terms that there will never be a point 
at which further copies cannot be in fact produced or created. However, not all of the criticisms of physical 
world socialism can be defeated quite so easily if the problem of the removal of the capitalist incentive effect for 
creators is considered. 
 
To consider the issue in the context of the entertainment industries, and to borrow the terms of Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels10, socialism can be thought to apply to the digital sphere by considering the bourgeoisie11 
to be the creators or, more accurately and realistically, the entertainment industries encompassing the distributors 
and publishers, in that both tend to enjoy a larger share of the profits generated by intellectual property than the 
creators. Similarly, the proletariat12 can be considered to be the consumers or the users of the internet. As the 
characteristics of cyber socialism discussed above point out, consumers are also producers and producers are 
also consumers. In parallel to this, many of the facets of what has superficially been dubbed “web 2.0” in fact 
encompass applications where the consumer is encouraged to contribute effort for their fellow internet users by 
producing. As the video sharing site YouTube13 encourages the creation and dissemination of user made films, 
so the rise of the “citizen journalist” phenomenon14 is giving rise to an increase in instances where the reader 
becomes both writer and photo journalist. These models are in their relative infancy, and as such still tend to 
operate on the basis of the user producing work that results in a profit for the hosting or controlling body, i.e. the 
cyber bourgeoisie. 
 
The point at which file sharing and piracy regulation currently plays a role lies around the moment that the 
cyber proletariat uses work that has been produced by the cyber bourgeoisie without the permission of the latter. 
Without this regulation, some of the cyber proletariat may argue that a state of anarchy could exist15. Although 
the notion that “property is theft” as submitted by Proudhon16 may well appear to approve of the notion of  
                                                          
8
 W Davies and K Withers, Public Innovation: Intellectual Property in a Digital Age (Institute for Public Policy Research, 
London 2006), 78. 
9
 P Himanen, The Hacker Ethic (Random House, 2002). 
10
 Marx and Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' (Marxists Internet Archive 1848) 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm> accessed March 2011. 
11
 Defined in Marxist socialism as the social class that is in control of the common means of production; ibid Chapter I. 
12
 Defined in Marxist socialism as the social class that is not in control of the common means of production, necessitating the 
offering of their own labour capabilities to the bourgeoisie in exchange for a wage in order to survive; ibid Chapter I. 
13
 See <http://www.youtube.com/> accessed March 2011. 
14
 Whereby news agencies and outlets request submissions from their readers. 
15
 For example, Walker discusses the pluralist approach to accepting an “anarchy of highly differentiated units or nodes of 
legal authority” as opposed to “an anarchy of formally identical states” as the new state of nature that would accept the 
physical world without making any demands upon it; N Walker, 'Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the 
Global Disorder of Normative Orders' (2008) 6(3/4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 373, 390. 
16
 P-J Proudhon, What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1994). 
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intellectual property being reused once it has left the direct control of the rights holder, the fact remains that an 
anarchist view would be as impracticable as it would be contrary to all who have spent a lifetime following 
capitalist ideals. This could well explain why commentators focussing on the jurisprudence of intellectual 
property regulation more often prefer to rely upon the earlier discourse on the concept of property as submitted 
by Locke17. Locke argues that as every person owns their own labour, property rights can be accrued (both from 
their natural state as they would be found in a state of nature, discussed below, or from their previous owner) by 
mixing your own labour with it to provide added value. The notion that the addition of labour to property creates 
a right to its fruits has been discussed widely when considering the practical extent and imposition of intellectual 
property rights18, particularly in the context of the assertion that most intellectual creation has been formed on 
the basis of other works. But the principle problem when it comes to applying the theory suggested by Locke to 
the digital arena lies in defining boundaries of what precisely defines labour expended to the extent that it will 
initiate a moral transfer of rights (or creation of a new set of rights) from the existing creator to the new creator. 
 
This point can be illustrated by considering as an example the contemporary practice of file sharers in their 
quest to distribute and share intellectual property. The CDPA currently provides provision for intellectual 
property to be used without authorisation in particular circumstances without constituting an infringement. For 
example, the use of the work can be for the purposes of reporting19, research and private study20. But can it ever 
be argued that digitising a work and encoding it into a format optimal for transferral over the internet adds value 
to the work in a Lockean sense? A film which may take up in excess of 4GB on a DVD or more than 20GB on a 
Blu-ray disc can be converted from its native format21 using a far more recent and exponentially more efficient 
codec22 to reduce it to around 700MB in size without any discernible loss in quality23. It can then be argued that, 
at least in a purely technical sense, through the exercise of skill and expertise required to re-encode the file, a 
new piece of intellectual property derived from the original work has been created and, further, it carries with it a 
higher degree of desirability (and thus value) to peer to peer network users due to its smaller file size and 
comparable quality. The problem lies in the justification that through the expenditure of this relatively minor 
labour upon the original file, the re-encoder would morally become the new beneficiary to the fruits of the labour 
according to Locke. After all, this new labour is comparatively trivial when compared to the labour required to, 
for example, produce a feature film. In considering this conundrum, Griffin reminds us that the UK copyright 
system previously allowed for the making of certain adaptations through translation and abridgement until the 
more restrictive principles of the Berne Convention was enshrined in the Copyright Act 191124. Griffin suggests 
that such a merit-based system should be reintroduced to move the bias of copyright law back away from the 
rights holders. Applying the principles from which this system originated in a Lockean sense can not only be 
useful in redressing the creeping imbalance that has developed over the course of the last century, but the 
principles themselves (in common with those of cyber socialism) are demonstrably at a fundamental level more 
appropriate to the original nature of the internet and the classic philosophies that describe its state of nature. 
                                                          
17
 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988). 
18
 For example, see WM Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University 
Press, Boston 2003). 
19
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s.30. 
20
 CDPA 1988 s.29. 
21
 The native format for a film on a DVD is MPEG-2, and has remained unchanged since the DVD Video format was 
standardised in 1996. 
22
 Such as the MPEG-4 based DivX; see <http://www.divx.com> accessed March 2011. 
23
 Although a standard television definition file could be reduced from 4GB to 700MB with ease, the high definition video 
content and uncompressed soundtrack on a blu-ray disc can, and is, just as readily reduced down to a video file and 
correspondingly compressed soundtrack that can amount to as little as around 2GB without a significant loss of quality. 
24
 JGH Griffin, 'An historical solution to the legal challenges posed by peer-to-peer file sharing and digital rights 
management technology' (2010) 15(3) Communications Law 78. 
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4. The State of Cyber Nature 
The non-reformist concept of socialism in the physical world is intrinsically tied into the notion of revolution; 
that is, the proletariat wresting power from the bourgeoisie25. In contrast, the internet has originated from what 
can be described as a state of cyber nature, and has over time evolved into the artificially regulated market that it 
has become. Proponents of imposing regulation upon the internet tacitly support the version of this notion as 
submitted by Hobbes, in that their prediction that an unregulated cyberspace will lead to a hostile and anarchic 
wild west whereby human self-interest drives the destruction of the creative industries demonstrates strong 
parallels with the idea that the state of nature is aggressive and destructive towards industry and innovation26. 
 
The basis of this theory lies in the notion that humans are driven purely by felicity, and that moral sense is 
short circuited by the need for self-preservation driven by a scarcity of resources. But this is where cyberspace 
differs from the model of the physical world – there is no scarcity of resources, as every creative work is 
effectively inexhaustible due to efficient copying. Without the scarcity Hobbes describes, the prime reason for 
the need for the bypassing of moral sense in the quest for felicity is removed, thus restoring the moral 
imperative. It is recognised that human nature, when left to its own devices, will not exclusively eschew 
collective rationality in favour of individualistic selfishness without such a driving force: “The great majority of 
us accept that we should not attack other people or take their property. Of course in a state of nature a minority 
would steal and kill, as they do now, but there would be enough people with a moral sense to stop the rot 
spreading and prevent the immoral minority from bringing us to a general war.”27 If it was understood that a 
killing in the physical world would equate to the destruction of an online presence such as a business or an 
individual interest in cyberspace (as stealing or taking the property of another can certainly not be equated with 
copying), then it would follow that users of the internet would impose a moral code upon themselves. 
 
It is at this point that the argument submitted by Locke that the physical world originated in a more 
optimistic state of nature28 than that suggested by Hobbes becomes a compelling point of comparison to the 
origins of the internet: “It is a state in which men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking anyone else’s permission – all this subject only 
to limits set by the law of nature.”29 Locke goes on to point out that the reason that humanity evolved away from 
this seemingly utopian state of nature into a civilised society governed by the state was through the need for 
protection of property. But the reason property requires protection, according to the view of Locke, is that it is in 
such short supply that individuals necessarily must eventually come to rely on other individuals to meet their 
needs. Yet, as we have already seen, intellectual property is distinguishable from this concept of physical 
property in that it is effectively inexhaustible. In simple terms, there is plenty of room in cyberspace for every 
person that is connected. Further, the currently existing level of technology would allow the entire population of 
the earth to join cyberspace concurrently and there would still be plenty of room remaining (as there are 
effectively no boundaries to the internet). 
 
Further to this, Locke argues that mankind leaves the state of nature at a time when they feel they are ready 
to formalise the social contract that will have evolved, and then enter into a regulated society: “I also affirm that 
all men are naturally in the state of nature, and remain so until they consent to make themselves members of  
                                                          
25
 See K Marx and F Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' (Marxists Internet Archive 1848) 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm> accessed March 2011; & A Schaff, 
'Marxist Theory on Revolution and Violence' (1973) 34(2) Journal of the History of Ideas 263. 
26
 Hobbes suggested that, in the state of nature, “there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no 
commodious Building… no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death”; T Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford 2008), 186. 
27J Wolff, Political Philosophy (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006), 12. 
28
 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988). 
29
 Ibid Chapter 2, para.4. 
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some political society.”30 But to contrast this with the digital domain, regulation has arguably been levied onto 
the users of the internet without their permission. Indeed, some internet commentators have made it abundantly 
clear that leaving the state of cyber nature is the wish furthest from the minds of the common user of the 
internet31. In this respect, the intervention of state control is essentially being rejected in favour of retaining the 
state of cyber nature. 
 
This means that the only argument that is left for the Lockean theorist that is in favour of moving away from 
this state lies in the exhaustion of the value of property, as distinct from the physical property itself. Indeed, it 
has already been established that intellectual property can be reproduced and distributed at a cost that is 
negligible to the extent of being practically free of such cost, but this does not necessarily mean that the 
economic and non-economic value of the property remains unaffected. The question of what would provide 
authors and creators with an incentive to create works if they were to agree to diminish the rights usually 
afforded to them via copyright legislation, or even if they relinquished these rights by releasing the fruits of their 
labour into the public domain, can be addressed with the aid of efficient digital distribution models and 
associated concepts such as the network effect32, the sampling effect33, advertising supported distribution34 and 
indirectly supported distribution35. The internet cannot presently be described as a de facto utopia devoid of the 
necessity of money, but it is this fact that illustrates the importance of maintaining the relationships between the 
digital domain and the physical world. It is vital to recognise that despite being capable of comparison with 
states and other forms of political government, cyberspace is not a parallel world that runs independently of the 
physical world. It is instead an extension of this physical world and its associated practices where, through both 
design and evolution, optimal efficiency has developed in digital equivalents to physical world practices such as 
the distribution of information. This distinction in viewpoints is particularly important in the context that real 
world socialism to a large extent relies upon the state that has adopted the socialist philosophy as a political ideal 
to be either financially and productively independent from non-socialist states, or existing in a place where every  
                                                          
30
 Ibid Chapter 2, para.15. 
31
 These views are succinctly summarised in a work drafted by Barlow, a founder of the US Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
in response to the enactments of the US Telecommunications Acts that were seen as interfering with the state of nature that 
had evolved by that point in cyberspace: “Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does 
not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It 
is an act of nature and grows itself through our collective actions.”; JP Barlow, 'A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace' (Electronic Frontier Foundation 1996) <http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html> accessed March 
2011. 
32
 See IPL Png, 'Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research' (2006) 3(2) Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 3 
& F Oberholzer-Gee and K Strumpf, 'The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis' (University of 
North Carolina 2005) <http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_June2005_final.pdf> accessed March 2011 for 
empirical evidence in support of the value of the network effect in the context of the entertainment industries, and 
commentary on the role of the network effect in relation to software in the Microsoft antitrust case at A Andreangelli, 
'Interoperability as an "Essential Facility" in the Microsoft Case - Encouraging Competition or Stifling Innovation?' (2009) 
34(4) European Law Review 584. 
33
 See MD Smith and R Telang, 'Piracy or Promotion? The Impact of Boradband Internet Penetration on DVD Sales' (Social 
Science Research Network 2009) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=918240#> accessed March 2011 & B 
Danaher and others, 'Converting Pirates Without Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of Digital Distribution on Physical 
Sales and Internet Piracy' (Social Science Research Network 2010) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1381827#> accessed March 2011 for discussion on the sampling effect 
acting as form of advertising for authorised copies, increasing their value as opposed to cannibalising sales. 
34
 See M Pesce, 'Piracy is Good? How Battlestar Galactica Killed Broadcast TV' (2005) 
<http://www.mindjack.com/feature/piracy051305.html> accessed March 2011 for a suggested model of advertising 
supported distribution. 
35
 For extensive analyses of indirectly supported distribution models such as the use of associated value-added services, 
subscription models as successfully used by Spotify and the novel means employed by Radiohead of offering their music on 
a “pay-what-you-like” basis with profitable results, see D Bounie, M Bourreau and P Waelbroeck, 'Piracy and the Demand 
for Films: Analysis of Piracy Behaviour in French Universities' (2006) 3(2) Review of Economic Research on Copyright 
Issues 15 & S James, 'The Times They Are A-Changin': Copyright Theft, Music Distribution And Keeping The Pirates At 
Bay' (2008) 15(5) Entertainment Law Review 106. 
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state is socialist. As the internet is a multinational space that runs in correspondence with the physical world, it 
follows that if cyber socialism is to prevail, then the former scenario must be adhered to which dictates that the 
physical world (which is largely not socialist) must not suffer economically. 
 
Just as Charles Eden, the governor of the US state of North Carolina in the early 18th century, was thought to 
have pardoned the unlawful activities of pirate Edward Teach36 so that he could enter into fruitful trade with 
him, so the entertainment industries could be seeking new avenues of profiting from the activities of 
contemporary pirates active on the internet. Digital distribution models that depict the relationship between the 
entertainment industries and consumers reveal a number of methods compatible with the values of cyber 
socialism in that a wide dissemination of intellectual property over the internet can demonstrate a positive effect 
on the physical world in several such ways. An advertising supported model relies on the embedding of 
advertising within the files that are shared by internet users. As suggested by Pesce37, if this model were to be 
employed to the industry of broadcast television, it would follow that the more widely a television programme is 
disseminated, the higher the value the entrenched advertising would command, and thus so would the value of 
the programme increase. Such models also provide many opportunities for indirect funding, one example being 
the internet service providers taking advantage of their relatively new status as intermediaries for the digital 
world by offering subscription prices that are either directly or indirectly related to the requirements of file 
sharers for more bandwidth and higher download speeds. It has been established by commentators such as Png38 
that widely distributed content can be shown to lead to an increase in its physical world value due to the network 
effect. This was illustrated by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf39 who have pointed out that the network effect in 
relation to music has been shown to lead to an increase in sales of concert tickets and merchandising in the 
physical world. 
 
When considering digital copies of content, it is difficult to justify an argument suggesting that the value, 
whether economic or non-economic in nature, can be exhausted through efficient distribution. Indeed, part of the 
regulatory problem arguably lies in the key stake holders and legislature failing to recognise the fundamental 
difference between tangible products and their corresponding digital counterparts, a criticism identified by 
Barlow40. By turning their backs on or attempting to restrict the new digital models that have grown out of the 
demand generated by the proportion of their customers who utilise the internet and have in turn driven the 
evolution of revolutionary new models of consumption, the industries are failing to identify an entire portion of 
society as a new breed of customer ripe to be nurtured, opting instead to alienate these customers into pursuing 
alternate means, or indeed the traditional means they utilised regardless prior to regulation, to satisfy their 
demands outside of the artificial and arbitrary boundaries placed around them. It would in turn appear that this 
failure is being supported by the legislature, which is applying physical world norms inappropriately to the 
digital realm of intellectual property. This is being done without the users of the internet unanimously, or 
arguably even as a majority, agreeing to a social contract that will effectively establish a governance over the 
internet parallel to physical world regulation, and that will set the internet apart from the state of cyber nature 
that it has already increasingly been forced away from. If there were ever to be a cyber socialist revolution, it  
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would apparently be carried out against the cyber bourgeoisie on the basis of a perceived invasion that is both as 
uninvited and unwarranted as it is inappropriate41. 
5. Self Regulation 
If the cyber proletariat is indeed forming its own civilisation of the mind within cyberspace and such a 
civilisation is based on the state of cyber nature, pro-restriction bodies such as those representing the 
entertainment industries would no doubt be quick to ask how such a civilisation could ever hope to govern itself 
without falling into anarchy42. By looking to both the early era of the internet and the many areas of the 
contemporary digital world that operate contrary to pre-existing domestic and international legislation, the 
answer that is yielded is through a form of self regulation. There are certainly doubts when it comes to 
considering how useful self regulation can be as a tool in terms of the regulation of the physical world. For 
example, in the arena of financial law, the legislature has attempted to adopt a number of approaches to the 
regulation of insider dealing. In the first instance, the application of a self regulatory approach that tasked a 
number of self regulatory organisations with ensuring the practice was curtailed failed to have any meaningful 
effect upon the practice43. The regime was later replaced with criminal legislation which also failed to 
effectively regulate the practice in all but the largest and most incompetent instances44 before eventually being 
widened to its current state of encompassing civil legislative routes alongside the ill-suited criminal regulation45.  
 
Again though, we are reminded that the rules of the physical world do not always apply to the digital world 
as many examples of self regulation can be seen to be operating effectively within cyberspace, in terms of users 
of the internet being given the power to act as a collective of enforcers. The regulations that are presently 
enforced online are, as they are with the practice and culture surrounding the financial world within which 
insider dealing resides, customs that have evolved, although here through the natural use of the internet. For 
example, many internet discussion forums afford particular trusted members with the power to edit and / or 
censor comments made by their fellow users. The most notable example of self regulated crowd sourcing is the 
approach taken by Wikipedia46, which has taken this breed of regulation a step further by allowing any user of 
the website to edit any page listed in its online encyclopaedia. If norms or customs are not abided to, such as if a 
user were to vandalise a page by entering false information or tampering with content mala fides, the theory 
behind the approach dictates that the majority of other users will correct the misdeed themselves. There is still  
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some degree of oversight, as users can register a complaint if necessary with the moderators of the website, who 
can then suspend the editing privileges of the subject of the complaint. 
 
These norms are comparable with those that could arguably be imposed by the legislature should it be 
deemed necessary to move regulation of the internet more fully into the hands of the state. However, the practice 
of file sharing can already be seen to carry with it a similar kind of self regulation that would most likely conflict 
with the current standpoint of the legislature. File sharers who use peer to peer networks such as BitTorrent to 
swap files largely do so without the permission of the rights holders. In an attempt to combat this, the rights 
holders often respond by using tactics such as uploading dummy files47 designed to frustrate file sharers by 
wasting the time and bandwidth they expend in downloading what they believe to be working unauthorised 
copies, and misreporting working unauthorised copies as fake on BitTorrent indexing sites. But self regulation 
within the file sharing world has gone some way to impeding these tactics. File sharers invariably outnumber 
those who desire to utilise these tactics, and so they will tend to collectively post reports that a file is fake on 
indexing sites which will prompt them to be “nuked”48, and can cumulatively bury49 false reports. There are also 
a number of software programmes that have been developed for free distribution that act as extra firewalls that 
have been optimised to block the IP addresses of all known providers of dummy files, in addition to rights 
holders and their representatives and anti-piracy enforcement and monitoring bodies. 
 
This behaviour and the general culture of sharing is bolstered by the design of the BitTorrent software itself 
in that it has been programmed to perpetuate the uploading of files on at least an equal basis to how much data 
has been downloaded. This in itself is reinforced further by particular BitTorrent indexing sites restricting their 
services to members who agree to allow the IP address they use for file sharing to be monitored to ascertain that 
they are uploading at least as much data as they are downloading in exchange for superior torrent file indexing 
and download speeds through their trackers. Together, file sharers have effectively constructed a culture of 
sharing that has evolved through nothing more than the norms and behaviour associated with internet use 
through a non-contrived form of self regulation. In this respect, the anarchy of the internet has been successfully 
brought under control without the assistance of state regulators or their legislation. 
6. The Creative Commons 
Despite the self regulation that has evolved with the internet, many commentators still argue that a failure to 
apply external regulation will eventually see the online world collapse into a state of pure anarchy. For example, 
in his discourse on the shaping of the regulation of the internet, Lessig submits that the culture of corruption and 
criminal control that befell some Eastern European states after the fall of communism in the latter part of the 
1980s could be described as a “modern if plodding anarchy”50. In likening this state of affairs to the libertarian 
ideology of those commentators51 who have argued that the internet should encompass the ideals of “freedom 
without anarchy, control without government, consensus without power”52, Lessig argues that there necessarily 
must be state control of the internet as, he submits, what has been referred to here as cyber socialism will 
inevitably fall into the same kind of anarchy seen in post-communist Europe. 
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Although Lessig himself admits that this view may not necessarily be correct53, his most famous solution for 
how to shape the control he sees as inevitable nevertheless has its roots firmly entrenched in the ideals of open 
source; namely, the Creative Commons54. As suggested by the nomenclature, the Creative Commons 
encapsulates licenses that are based on the theory that intellectual property in the form of creative works should 
be available for use in terms comparable to physical world commons such as parks, but with the usual distinction 
allowed for by the internet in that it permits such commons to be shared by as many users who desire to use it 
without being exhaustible. In this respect, it can be considered a form of open source licensing for not only 
software, but other works too. The licenses can in fact be applied to any work capable of being subject to 
copyright protection, and can be tailored by the initial rights holder to maintain, limit or relinquish several key 
rights attached to the work55. This effectively grants rights holders the option of relying on a wide middle ground 
between the legal extremes of full copyright protection on the one hand, and on the other an unconditional 
relinquishing of many rights attached to the work that would see it practically entering the public domain. 
 
The Creative Commons was founded in the guise of a non-profit organisation in the US in 2001, supported 
by the Centre for Public Domain. The founders were influential law professor Lawrence Lessig, who has 
published widely on the area of freeing copyright regulation and has also been involved with the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation; Eric Eldred, who was represented by Lessig when he legally challenged the constitutional 
validity of arbitrarily extending the default copyright term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years in the US 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 199856; and Hal Abelson, a US computer science professor who has 
been involved with the Free Software Foundation. The principle goals of the Creative Commons are to “increase 
the amount of creativity (cultural, educational, and scientific content) in ‘the commons’, the body of work that is 
available to the public for free and legal sharing, use, repurposing, and remixing”, and to define “the spectrum of 
possibilities between full copyright and the public domain”57. The organisation approached the task of offering a 
more flexible and open alternative to copyright by drafting and releasing a series of Creative Commons licenses 
for the public, or indeed any member of society or body corporate, to freely use and apply to their creative 
works. 
6.1. The Licenses 
The primary licenses are based on several key permissions and stipulations that can be customised by the 
licensor so that they merge into a fully formed license. Every core Creative Commons license includes an 
Attribution58 term that preserves the moral right of paternity59 through the inclusion of a requirement for future 
users to attribute the work to its author no matter how it is used. For example, if a creator was to publish a 
photograph with a basic CC BY license, users would be permitted to distribute and republish the photograph 
provided they gave credit to the creator. Creators may choose to apply a Non-Commercial60 term to the license 
that will allow users to copy, distribute, play or perform the work provided it is done in a non-commercial 
context. For example, if the photograph considered above was subject to a CC BY-NC license, a user would be 
permitted to distribute the photograph and even post it on a personal website along with the attribution to the 
creator, but would not be able to publish the photograph on a commercial website or in a commercially available 
book without permission. These licenses allow for derivative works to be made from the original work. For  
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example, the photograph above could be used in a collage provided attribution to the original author was given 
(and the collage was not used for commercial purposes if the NC clause was applied). 
 
If the creator does not wish to allow for derivative works to be made, they can utilise the No Derivate 
Works61 portion of the license. This would allow, for example, a video that was subject to a CC BY-ND license 
to be copied, distributed, played, broadcast or posted to websites (which would only have to be in a non-
commercial context if a CC BY-NC-ND license was applied) in its complete and exact form, but it would not 
permit a user to edit the video. If the creator does wish to allow derivatives of their work to be made, the Share 
Alike62 term can be used to require such derivative works to be subject to the same licensing terms that were 
applicable to the original work. For example, a video subject to a CC BY-SA license could be taken by another 
user and edited into a new piece of work. This new video could then be used for any purpose, including 
commercial use, but it would automatically be subject to its own CC BY-SA license. Thus future users could still 
freely share the new derivative video and even make their own derivate work based upon it, but would in turn be 
required to maintain the original CC BY-SA license terms. The original creator may also include the Non-
Commercial term, which would form a CC BY-NC-SA license. 
 
Of the six main licenses that can be formed utilising these four terms, the Attribution (CC BY) license is the 
most open and unrestricted in that it allows end users to use the licensed work for any purpose, the only proviso 
being that credit must be given to the original author. The Attribution Share Alike (CC BY-SA) license has been 
likened to standard software open source licensing63, although the CC BY-SA license, in common with all 
Creative Commons licenses, can be used with any kind of creative or copyrightable work. As with open source 
licenses, the CC BY-SA license allows for the original work to be taken, adapted and used for any purpose, 
including commercial purposes, with the only provisos being attribution to the original author and the 
application of identical licensing terms to the new work. Open source licenses, such as MPL64, also allow for 
pieces of software to be modified and sold, provided that the source code is made freely available. In contrast, 
the Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives (CC BY-NC-ND) license is the most restrictive, and is referred 
to as the “free advertising” license65 due to the fact that the license nevertheless frees up the work enough for it 
to be subject to market externalities such as the network effect, whereby any brand associated with the work, 
along with the name of the author, will see an increase in awareness and value due to the work being freely 
distributable. 
 
The Creative Commons organisation has more recently widened the scope of its licenses on both sides of the 
spectrum of restrictiveness by offering two more licenses that are distinct from the six main general licenses. The 
six main licenses offer a “Some Rights Reserved” approach as opposed to the “All Rights Reserved” stance 
enshrined in copyright law. However, the No Rights Reserved, or CC0, license takes a step further away from 
copyright law by allowing the author to as fully as possible waive all of the rights attached to their creation. 
Applying this license to a work will essentially see the work entering the public domain, and will therefore allow 
it to be used for any purpose without even requiring the moral right of paternity to be recognised. On the other 
side of the scale lies the Founders’ Copyright license, which essentially applies the same terms to the work as 
standard copyright but with a shorter term of 14 years, with the option to renew the term by another 14 years. 
This license is based on the original copyright clause included in the US constitution, which aimed to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries”66. 
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The original term of protection, along with the clause of the constitution itself, was based on the initial term 
set by the originator of statutory copyright, the Statute of Anne67, which stipulated an initial term of 14 years that 
was extendable by a further 14 years. This term has been extended a number of times since, most recently by the 
US Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1998 which increased the term from life plus 50 years to life 
plus 70 years, and 120 years after creation for corporately produced works. Creative Commons founders Eldred 
and Lessig challenged this through the courts, arguing that extending the term was contrary to the original 
wording of the constitution (namely to promote the progress of science and useful arts); that most copyrighted 
works make the majority of their profits during their first few years of existence; that the extension of the term is 
disproportionate to the increased life of humans; that any extension of the term is damaging to non-profit 
organisations and educational establishments; and that retrospectively renewing all copyrights opens the door to 
perpetual copyright, which is directly contrary to the wording of the US constitution offering protection for a 
limited time68. Although these notions receive support from commentators such as Fox, Ciro and Duncan69 who 
point out the irony of Disney, one of the strongest lobbyists in favour of the extension of copyright term, basing 
a significant proportion of their output on established and existing works in the public domain70, the Supreme 
Court ruled that “Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending 
the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress’ Copyright Clause authority”71. In the 
absence of a legal victory, the philosophy suggested by Eldred and Lessig persists in the Founders’ Copyright 
license. 
6.2. Criticism 
In contextualising the viewpoint of the Creative Commons licenses with the philosophies of Locke and Hegel, 
the latter by Landes and Posner72, the licenses have been criticised by some commentators as acting contrary to 
the view frequently submitted by Lessig that intellectual works should not be treated as “creative property”73. 
However, it is arguable that this does not fully accurately describe the basis of the view espoused by Lessig. For 
example, in the same piece in which Lessig submits his argument that rejects the possibility of communism as 
applied to the digital domain successfully existing74, rather than arguing that intellectual property should be 
freely shared unencumbered by property rights (which would be supporting the notion he has already rejected), 
Lessig submits that as opposed to conceding to what he views as a form of anarchy, users of the internet should 
grasp the impetus to shape the form of control that he maintains will inevitably be imposed upon authors, 
creators and internet users. After all, open source licensing (upon which the Creative Commons is based) cannot 
be accurately described as supporting an anarchistic approach, as common open source licenses, such as the 
Mozilla Public License75, impose restrictions to the use of the software to which they are applied76 to guarantee 
the applicability and spirit of the license. 
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If this is the correct interpretation, then it can be argued that the Creative Commons actually diminishes the 
permission culture the commentators above liken to standard licensing as supplied by what is defined as “Big 
Media”77 in return for a fee. If a work is created and a Creative Commons license is not applied, copyright 
legislation will automatically become applicable to rights in relation to it. Thus, any party who wishes to use or 
distribute the work in any way that is contrary to what is permitted by domestic legislation will be required to 
seek permission from the rights holder. But if a work has a Creative Commons license attached to it, the work 
will carry with it an enforceable unilateral contract that relinquishes certain legislative restrictions and 
guarantees the end user a full set of rights in order to facilitate sharing and distribution. Indeed, variations of the 
Creative Commons license such as the Founders’ Copyright78 illustrate how the ideology is entrenched in a 
combination of traditionalist values and adaptability designed to operate smoothly with the efficient distribution 
that has been progressively evolving over and facilitated by the internet. 
 
Commentators such as Elkin-Koren79 and Broussard80 have further questioned the ability of the licenses to 
recognise and preserve the financial remuneration and recognition that motivate creators and authors. This has 
been countered by Lessig81 who points out that copyright until relatively recently has proven successful with 
traditional models via a far shorter term of protection and an opt-in system whereby copyright would only be 
applicable if it was registered by the author. Thus, the Creative Commons licenses restore this narrower but no 
less valid protection left behind by the constant movement of copyright regulation towards automatic registration 
and longer terms. Indeed, these criticisms also fail to take into account the plethora of alternative revenue 
streams that are provided for through new digital distribution models and efficient distribution models that rely 
upon the network effect and indirect funding, inter alia. By allowing free non-commercial distribution with 
attribution to take place under any of the core licenses, the network effect will always be fed, increasing brand 
awareness, desirability and sales of associated finite products and services. This approach also allows for 
indirectly supported funding to be accrued through advertising and subscription-based models. For example, if a 
television programme containing product placement was released under a license containing a no derivate works 
term, such as CC BY-ND, the programme could be freely shared increasing the value of the advertising within 
the programme while providing legal protection against removing or otherwise interfering with the advertising. 
 
If other criticisms that suggest that Creative Commons licenses are not as open or as compatible as 
comparable software licenses or even the physical commons itself82 are answerable with the response that the 
regime provides a middle ground between the all rights reserved of copyright and the no rights reserved of the 
public domain83, the last substantive critique left standing is the submission that the appropriate mechanism for 
creating an intellectual commons designed to provide an alternative to or extension of copyright is the political 
sphere as opposed to “legal professors setting them down on pieces of paper”84. This criticism suggests that 
regulations should only originate from the political sphere, but the Creative Commons movement has 
nevertheless already accrued political awareness and affirmation through its alternative route. The Creative 
Commons licenses have been afforded validity, recognition and enforceability under European common law85,  
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and have further been adopted as the standard licenses for public sector information by the governments of 
Australia86 and the US87. Relying on the political sphere to produce regulations is often tempered by its 
susceptibility to lobbying from wealthy corporations that can drown out the interests of the collective majority, 
and is also impeded by the lack of technical expertise inherent in government. Those who have chosen to 
construct and maintain the Creative Commons licenses are enthusiasts of technology and largely academically 
qualified in law, and therefore have the understanding of the technical and socio-legal aspects of the internet and 
its associated digital world to grant them the capability of recognising new models and the good that can be 
achieved through a more open version of copyright. If there is criticism to be made over the origins of the 
Creative Commons, it is to be directed not at those who have taken the impetus to suggest a robust and realistic 
opening of licensing, but at the legislature for failing to create such regulations itself. Simply put, the Creative 
Commons currently plays host to the most convincing compromise between the ideologies of pure public domain 
and cyber socialism, and the artificially restrictive monopoly granted by copyright legislation. 
6.3. Adopting the Creative Commons 
Farchy88 suggests that the three most prominent critiques of copyright legislation lie in the fact that as copyright 
is at the root of access limitation, it is consequently responsible for the under-use of the pool of existing 
resources and works89; that copyright regulations favour the interests of intermediaries and the big media 
industries who abuse their position at the expense of the artists and creators90; and that ultimately any form of 
protection that is excessive will inevitably decrease social wellbeing91. If the Creative Commons licenses are to 
be the solution to these criticisms, they must be more fully embraced and recognised. Fitzgerald92 points out that 
law reform and new business models should consider the relationships between both commercial and non-
commercial interests in the online domain, and that this can be achieved through the encouragement of Creative 
Commons licensing. It is further suggested that that such licenses being compulsory would be a more desirable 
option than the continuing criminalisation of everyday internet users carried out as a substitute to offering new 
business models93. Tamura94 suggests several alternatives, the first being the restoration of earlier copyright 
legislation that did not grant automatic protection so that newly created works would fall into the public domain 
unless the creator registers the work, or the adoption of a Creative Commons license as the default protection 
offered automatically to new works95. Less drastic alternatives are also suggested, namely limiting the scope of 
copyright protection only within the digital sphere, or the reduction of the copyright term so that copyright 
protection will be decreased unless the rights holder applies for an extension and pays a stipulated fee. Finally, 
Litman96 suggests that copyright infringements should only be found to exist in instances of large scale or 
commercial use of a work that are conclusively shown to deprive the rights holder of measurable income that is 
not negligible in scale. 
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These ideas do not come without their pitfalls. For example, while lowering the level of copyright protection 
unless a work is registered by the rights holder with a responsible governmental body in exchange for a fee 
would offer some incentive against needlessly extending protection for works that are no longer financially 
viable, there is a risk that such a system would favour the larger corporations in that these bodies tend to have the 
disposable income to plough into such endeavours regardless of utility. Any reduction of copyright protection 
across the board is also likely to be met with phenomenal resistance from the very same corporations that have 
so far successfully persuaded the legislature to enforce the precise opposite, and thus remains an unrealistic 
prospect. However, the notion of reducing copyright protection purely for the digital sphere is compelling in that 
it recognises the fundamental differences between the physical world and digital world markets, and the 
application of a Creative Commons license by default would ensure that basic protections are always guaranteed 
without impeding efficient digital distribution models. Similarly, where full copyright protection does still exist, 
only recognising as an infringement any such activity that is shown to be commercial in nature or shown to de 
facto affect the economic opportunities of the rights holder has the advantage of baring similarity to the existing 
terms of the CDPA that distinguish civil infringements from criminal offences97. It would be particularly useful 
to stipulate the definition of affecting economic opportunities more precisely than has been done with the test of 
prejudicial affect in the CDPA98 so that the somewhat long-lost spirit of the test could be restored. Indeed, a 
clarification of the burden and standard of proof so that rights holders are required to demonstrate that loss or 
financial harm has in fact been suffered because of an infringement would surely be preferable than the blind 
acceptance of the wealth of unverifiable “research” with hidden methodologies and data sets currently offered by 
the industries that purports to make such claims. 
 
Taking into account the fact that any reduction in copyright term or protection is unlikely in the near future, 
the least radical way forward would be to grant Creative Commons licenses some form of statutory recognition 
alongside the existing copyright framework. The fact that current copyright protection is essentially an 
automatically applied super-license in tandem with the fact that Creative Commons licenses have already been 
recognised under common law mean that such a change will make little difference in terms of the legal validity 
of the CC licenses. However, by affording them a statutory basis, the public awareness of the licenses and their 
terms can be increased, which could encourage more creators to choose to utilise them. Criticisms that the 
multiple forms of license are too complex99 could be addressed by promoting awareness of the terms – the truth 
that all CC licenses allow free non-commercial distribution is a simple message, and the few remaining terms 
only become relevant when a user wishes to make a more advanced use of a work. Although this approach is not 
as desirable as that that would combine statutory recognition of CC licenses with a relaxation of existing 
copyright protection in the digital domain, it is unfortunately the only option that is, in the contemporary legal 
and political climate, even remotely realistic. 
7. Conclusion 
Although use of the internet is becoming increasingly widespread100, there remains a significant gulf between the 
varieties of skill levels possessed and the behaviour exhibited by internet users. Indeed, to a large extent the 
ideology of online freedom and the operation of new distribution and revenue models rely on this disparity. It 
may appear at first glance that the ideals of cyber socialism and the open internet seek to equalise access to the  
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internet so that every person enjoys the same technical knowledge and de facto access, but this would in fact 
have significant ramifications for many of the alternative avenues of funding suggested in the efficient 
distribution models discussed in this paper that have ostensibly been fashioned around a co-habitation of the 
capitalist physical world alongside the freer realm of cyberspace. Provided there is and as long as there will be 
two distinct categories of person in the physical world, namely those who are able to access the internet and 
those who cannot or do not, and as long as there lie further sub categories among the former category of user that 
will together pursue their goal of behaving as if a state of cyber socialism exists regardless of the status of the 
law, the likelihood will remain that this group will go on sharing files via the internet while, in the physical 
world, creators will continue to be provided with sufficient incentive to continue creating through their ability to 
accrue either value for their work or an indirect economic benefit from their labour through alternative and 
indirect revenue models. 
 
In practical terms, it would be unrealistic to expect the legislatures of the world to adopt a regulatory 
approach that expressly encourages a state of pure cyber socialism to exist in cyberspace within the foreseeable 
future, whether through fear of the unknown, a fundamental misunderstanding of the differences between the 
virtual and the physical world, or simply because they believe rather too much of what the entertainment 
industries tell them without supporting evidence. The risk is greatening that, with the advent of the Digital 
Economy Act 2010, domestic law is moving increasingly towards the DMCA-style of American conservatism. 
Yet the very basis of the internet indicates that this is the wrong direction. If regulators were to at least embrace 
the minimalist stance offered by the learning society by widening the focus of copyright to encompass the 
flexible approach of the Creative Commons, then the original spirit of the Statute of Anne as being “An Act for 
the Encouragement of Learning”101 could be maintained. To best uphold this spirit, the legislature should recall 
the traditional focus of the regulation in this area which concentrated upon the bargain between the author (or 
creator) and the consumer (or the user), as opposed to overemphasising the sole interests of intermediaries such 
as distributors and publishers. The relaxing of copyright laws to enable freer sharing of information for non-
commercial purposes would refocus the regulation upon the interests of both creators and consumers, and would 
also allow the internet and cyberspace to continue to grow and evolve unimpeded by the shackles of the past. 
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